Below I provide a list of current publications. Please contact me for copies of papers listed as under review or in press.

Note: All articles are the sole copyright of the respective publishers. Materials are provided for educational use only. Downloading of materials constitutes an agreement that the materials are for personal use only.


Monroe A. E., Ainsworth, S., Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2017). Reminders of the future heighten risk aversion in financial decision making, trust, and moral judgment. Social Cognition, 35, 66-78.

Monroe, A. E. & Malle, B. F. (2017). Two paths to blame: Intentionality directs moral information processing along two distinct tracks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 146, 123-133

Monroe, A. E., Brady, G. & Malle, B. F. (2016). This isn’t the free will worth looking for: General free will beliefs do not influence moral judgments, agent-specific choice ascriptions do. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 8, 191-199.

Monroe, A. E., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2016). Free will evolved for morality and culture. In Miller A. (Ed.). The Social Psychology of Good and Evil (2nd ed). (pp. 41-51). New York, NY: Guilford Press.

Monroe, A. E., Reeder, G. D., & James, L. (2015). Perceptions of intentionality for goal-related action: Behavioral description matters. PLoS ONE, 10, e0119841. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0119841

Baumeister, R.F. & Monroe, A. E. (2014). Recent Research on Free Will: Conceptualizations, Beliefs, and Processes. In Olson, J. M. and Zanna, M. P. (Eds.) Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 50, 1-52.

Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2014).  A theory of blame. Psychological Inquiry, 25, 147-186. Target article.

Malle, B. F., Monroe, A. E., & Guglielmo, S. (2014).  Paths to blame and paths to convergence. Psychological Inquiry, 25, 251-260. Reply to commentaries.

Monroe, A. E., Dillon, K. D., & Malle, B. F. (2014). Bringing free will down to earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment. Consciousness and Cognition, 27, 100-108.

Monroe A. E. & Malle, B. F. (2014). Free will without metaphysics. In Mele, A. (Ed.), Surrounding free will.  New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Monroe, A. E. & Reeder, G. D. (2014). Observing obedience: How sophisticated are social perceivers? Journal of Social Issues, 70, 554-557.

Malle, B. F., Guglielmo, S., & Monroe, A. E. (2012).  Moral, cognitive, and social: The nature of blame.  In J. Forgas, K. Fiedler, and C. Sedikides (Eds.), Social thinking and interpersonal behaviour. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Monroe, A. E., Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2012). Morality goes beyond mind perception. Commentary on Gray, Waytz & Young, Psychological Inquiry, 23, 179-184.

Pryor, J. B., Reeder, G. D., & Monroe, A. E. (2012).  The infection of bad company: Stigma-by-association. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102, 224-41.

Monroe, A. E., & Reeder, G. D. (2011). Motive-matching: Perceptions of intentionality for coerced action. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1255-1261.

Monroe, A. E. & Malle, B. F. (2010). From uncaused will to conscious choice: The need to study, not speculate about people’s folk concept of free will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9, 211-224.

Guglielmo, S., Monroe, A. E., & Malle, B. F. (2009). At the heart of morality lies folk psychology. Inquiry, 52, 449-466.

Pryor, J.B., Reeder, G.D., Monroe, A. E. & Patel, A (2008). Stigmas and pro-social behavior: Are people reluctant to help stigmatized persons? In S. Stürmer & M. Snyder (Eds.), The psychology of prosocial behavior: Group processes, intergroup relations, and helping (pp 59-80). London: Blackwell Publishers.

Reeder, G. D., Monroe, A. E., Pryor, J. B. (2008). Impressions of Milgram’s obedient teachers: Situational cues inform inferences about motives and traits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95, 1-17.